Research

Publications

  1. Modalization and Demodalization: On the Phenomenology of Negation. Forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy [doi] [Full Text]

  2. Metalanguage and Metaconsciousness: How Formal Logic Proceeds Towards True Being. Forthcoming in Till Grohmann, ed. The Phenomenology of Essences, Routledge [contact for draft].

  3. Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness. Grazer Philosophische Studien (2021), 98(2): 222-242 [doi] [Accepted Version]

  4. Husserl, Model Theory, and Formal Essences. Husserl Studies (2021), 37 (2): 103-125. [doi] [Accepted Version] [Full Text]

  5. A Modal Analysis of Phenomenal Intentionality: Horizonality and Object-Directed Phenomenal Presence. Synthese (2021) 198: 10903–10922 [doi] [Full Text]

  6. How to Be an Adverbialist About Phenomenal Intentionality. Synthese (2021) 198 (1): 661-686 [doi] [Full Text]

  7. What Is it Like to Think about Oneself? De Se Thought and Phenomenal Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2019), 18 (5): 919-932. [doi] [Full Text]

  8. Epistemic Logic, Monotonicity, and the Halbach-Welch Rapprochement Strategy. Studia Logica (2019), 107 (4): 669-693. [doi] [Accepted Version]

future research

My primary research interests are in phenomenology, logic, and philosophy of mind. I find myself drawn to issues that triangulate the three domains and that press into the question of how our thinking about logical form informs our thinking about the mind. This line of questioning emerges from a fundamental interest in understanding how systems of logic emerge from and in turn inform our phenomenological experience of reality. My primary training is in phenomenology from an analytic perspective, which combines a reading of Husserlian texts with a working knowledge of tools from analytic philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I also have a very strong background in formal logic and philosophical logic, especially in set theory, mathematical logic, modal logic, and model theory. These core areas of focus are supplemented and informed by a generalist interest in the history of philosophy, especially in areas such as German idealism, early analytic philosophy, and the history of logic more generally. 

The ways in which I have combined these backgrounds to inform my research has evolved over time. My dissertation—written between 2013-2017—was principally an attempt in philosophical logic. I was interested in applying tools from modal logic and formal semantics to build models that shed light on problems in philosophy of mind. More recently I have sought to expand my background in formal logic to widen my perspective on issues in the philosophy and historical development of logic. I have been especially drawn to foundational questions about the nature of logical form and the relationship between the logic of a theory and subject-matter the theory is supposed to range over. So far, my training in formal logic has enabled me to enrich the critical study of Husserl’s approach to logic—often neglected in favor of, for example the Frege and Wittgenstein trajectory—with more up-to-date tools from model theory. Though the last few years have seen philosophy of mind pushed to the background of my concerns, my recent research has pushed me to develop a wider-ranging view about how changes from the ancient to the modern theory of logical form shape the approach to philosophy of mind in modern philosophy and beyond.